



CILYDIS  
SFAACIS

**A Robust Nanosatellite OBC Created with  
SEL and SEU Immunity as a Driving  
Requirement**

# OBC Design Drivers





- Number of in-house missions requiring a robust 32bit OBC for on-board data handling function.
- No existing alternative within the typical CubeSat price point with the required level of resilience.
- Required characteristics included:
  - TID compatibility for 5 years in LEO.
  - Mitigation for SEE, SEL tolerant.
  - Low power consumption
  - Compatible with 80%+ of missions' requirements.
  - Compatible with the current Clyde Space/Bright Ascension Software product.
- Result is a layered SEE mitigation system, where hardware, firmware and software cooperate to create a robust protection system .




# PROCESSOR SELECTION


# FPGA vs MicroController




# FPGA




- FPGA SoC with integrated hard processor selected.
- Hard ARM Cortex M3 = low power
- >100DMIPS
- FPGA allows custom blocks:
  - Memory controller
    - EDAC
  - TMR GPIO Ports
  - DTMF decoder
  - ... more






# MEMORY SUBSYSTEM


# TID Performance





- Several technologies and components evaluated for non-volatile memory.
  - Flash devices, EEPROMs, PCRAM and MRAM
- Ferromagnetic memory and Magneto-resistive memories have a large tolerance for TID (partly due to the standard CMOS I/O interfaces).




# SEE Performance



- Tolerance to SEL of these devices on par with other memory technologies
- Results for a specific MRAM device suggest that it is essentially immune to latch-up, with no events recorded at 84 Mev/mg/cm2 (ref: JPL/NASA).
- Memory fabric for both ferromagnetic and magneto-resistive memories essentially immune to bit-flips, however I/O interfaces are not.
- MRAM 2 device selected with an ECC code implemented for high performance for TID and SEE.









**PROTECTION AGAINST SEE**


# Multiple levels of SEE protection



- Multi-layer approach to SEE
- Hardware
  - LCL – SEL Protection
  - Hot plug for power cycling
  - Non-volatile mem allows transparent recovery
- Firmware
  - EDAC/SECDED
- OS/Drivers
  - Retry & scrub mechanism
- Application
  - Logging, Checkpointing




# Memory Operational Modes





- The following modes of operation are supported by the memory system:
  - **Mirrored Memory -**
    - The selected memory bank is partitioned and automatically replicated by hardware on write operations.
    - Upon encountering a multi-bit read error the memory system retries the operation from the replicated bank.
  - **Write Verify Mode -**
    - If enabled every write operation is followed by a read-back which verifies the operation
  - **EDAC Mode -**
    - This is always enabled and provides SECDED protection to all memory.
    - A dual memory map is implemented, where in one location the memory is accessible in its RAW form, whilst in the other the protected memory is visible

# RAM/ROM EDAC Protection



- SECDED protection is implemented in hardware using a (18,6) custom Hsiao shortened Hamming code.
- The system provides:
  1. Transparent SECDED protection
  2. Transient (SEFI) protection
  3. Status (count) of single and double faults
  4. Interrupt on fault/double fault capability
  5. Bus error signals on single/double fault
  6. Access to RAW (unprotected) memory via a dual memory map configuration
- Transient faults are dealt via an automatic retry mechanism with elevation to a software handler on double failures.

# EDAC





- Data is SECDED protected
  - Organisation allows for 32 and 16 bit word writes without needing read/modify/write cycles = fast access.
- SECDED not enough! Address protection using Hash. Detects transient (SEFI) errors in control/address decoding logic (i.e. Write/Read from wrong address)

# Transparent SEU/SEL correction





- Transparent SEU correction
  - Interrupt/scrubbing used to write back corrected data
- Transparent Latch-up recovery
  - Automatic power cycle of memory buses
  - No loss of data due to Non-volatile memory






# SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM





# Comm Interfaces




## Intra-Board

- I2C
- SPI
- GPIO
- UART
- ADC TLM
  - 22 Board Telemetry channels

## Inter-Board

- 17 GPIO (LVDS support)
- 2x I2C
- SPI (6 CS lines)
- 4x RS232/422/485
- CAN
- Spacewire & QuadSPI
- DMA/PDMA support
- JTAG, DTMF


# Pin-Out




H1			
1	GPIO_A	GPIO_B	2
3	GPIO_C	GPIO_D	4
5	GPIO_E	GPIO_F	6
7	GPIO_G	GPIO_H	8
9	SPI_CS_A	SPI_CS_B	10
11	SPI_CS_C	SPI_CS_D	12
13	SPI_CS_E	SPI_CS_F	14
15	GPIO_J	GPIO_K	16
17	GPIO_L	GPIO_M	18
19			20
21	SPI_CLK	SPI_MISO	22
23	SPI_MOSI	SPI_CS	24
25			26
27	GPIO_R	GPIO_S	28
29	GPIO_T	GPIO_U	30
31	GPIO_V		32
33	232_RXA	232_RXB	34
35	232_TXA	232_TXB	36
37	422_RX+	422_TX+	38
39	422_RX-	422_TX-	40
41	SDA_A	CANH*	42
43	SCL_A	CANL*	44
45	SDA_B		46
47	SCL_B		48
49			50
51			52



H2			
1			2
3			4
5			6
7			8
9			10
11			12
13			14
15			16
17			18
19			20
21			22
23			24
25	5V_PLAT	5V_PLAT	26
27	3V3_PLAT	3V3_PLAT	28
29	GND	GND	30
31		GND	32
33			34
35			36
37			38
39			40
41			42
43			44
45	VBAT_PLAT	VBAT_PLAT	46
47			48
49	DTMF1	DTMF2	50
51	DTMF3	DTMF4	52


# End Result



17 GPIO (7 LVDS), 2xI2C, RS422/2x232, CAN







# Summary



New OBCs for that is designed to meet over 80% of all CubeSat mission requirements.



Designed for LEO operation with TID and SEE performance a critical design driver.



The solution provides a highly resilient data handling solution with multiple layers of protection inherent to design.



Designed to the same exacting product assurance requirements and high quality as all Clyde Space products.



Now in full production at Clyde Space.